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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (THE RELIGION CLAUSES). By
F. William O'Brien, S.J. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press,
1958. Pp. XI, 264.
This book is a study of the church-state decisions of the Supreme Court
since 1938. The author pays particular attention to the opinions of Justice Reed,
who came on the bench that year, and in doing so brings into sharp focus the
justice's attitude toward the applica.ion of the religion clause of the First
Amendment.
For the first four years of this period the judges were in general agreement.
It was not until the Court heard the case of Jones v. Opelika' that it can be said
Reed's position became clearly defined. An ordinance required agents, dealers
and distributors of books to pay a license fee of ten dollars or less per annum.
A member of Jehovah's Witnesses selling religious tracts on the street refused
to pay the fee, was convicted, and the Supreme Court in a 5 to 4 decision affirmed.
Dissenting Justices Stone, Black, Douglas and Murphy held the ordinance to be
an infringement of the free exercise of religion. Justice Reed, however, wrote
that the courts must respect the power of the states to regulate orderly living and
that the ordinance was a legitimate nondiscriminatory regulation and not a
capricious law of censorship.
In the years that followed, Justice Reed, in cases after case, criticized his
colleagues on the Court for showing lack of judicial restraint in condemning
legislation merely because they disagreed with its wisdom or its desirability.
The author points out a paradox in that Justices Black, Murphy and other
"liberal" justices in the New Deal era preached the doctrine of judicial restraint
in passing on legislation involving economic liberty but reversed their position
in the next decade* in striking down ordinances where there was only a remote
chance that personal liberties would be infringed. Reed espoused the principle
of judicial restraint while he was Solicitor General in the thirties and did not
abandon this principle over the years he served on the Court.
Father O'Brien points out that Reed championed the rights of the majority
when threatened by a small minority. Kovacs v. Cooper2 involved an ordinance
absolutely prohibiting the use on public streets of loud-speakers emitting "loud
1. 316 U.S. 584 (1941).
2. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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and raucous noises." Justice Reed pointed out that freedom of speech is not an
absolute right and must give way when it collides with the right of other citizens
to "peace, privacy and convenience."
The author, Father O'Brien, is a member of the government faculty of
Georgetown University. The book represents a valuable contribution in the field
of Constitutional Law. It is not only the result of painstaking research but also
careful and perceptive analysis. The work is divided into three parts, a discussion
of the cases involving the free exercise clause, the establishment clause, and a
critique on the constitutional principles of Justice Reed.
In his conclusion the author observes that the Court has begun to swing
back from the extreme position it took in the McCollum3 case where it cited its
dicta in the Everson4 case that a state cannot pass laws which give any aid to
religion. He says that Justice Reed's dissent in the McCollum case became the
foundation for Justice Douglas' opinion in the Zorach5 case, which found the
New York State "released time" statute to be constitutional, and which blunted
the Everson dicta in the following words:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being... When the state encourages religious instruction or co-operates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects
the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service
to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the
Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indiffer-
ence to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in
no religion over those who do believe. . . . We find no constitutional
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to
religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective"
scope of religions'influence."
KEVIN KENNEDY
Member of the New York Bar
3. MeCollum v. Board of Education, 323 U.S. 203 (1948).
4. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 )1847).
5. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
6. Id. at 313, 314.
